Sunday, January 13, 2008

On Free Will

The conflict between free-will and fatalism/determinism is a very old one. With the traditional predicate of a being (God) who is aware of the entire future, how does an individual truly have free will if their future is entirely deterministic? Or, to put it another way, if the actions (A) of an actor (X) at a point in time (T) are predicated on entirely upon the position with time (T-1), how does one derive a function in which AX is relevant to A at any given value of T?

There are a number of approaches to date. One is to argue that the question is irrelevant, because if the actions of T require a future belief of T-1, then ad nauseum (and by golly!), X's beliefs at T-1 will match those beliefs (a simplified Aristotilian Sea Battle argument; similar I believe to Aquinas's writings also). That seems to miss the point, in that if by definition X will hold the beliefs required to perform A at T - then X doesn't have free will, and his/her beliefs aren't really relevant - the same problem.

Another argument (Bohm, and derived dimensionality theory, also Boertism/Augustine's "God is beyond time" argument) is that space/time are actually just 4 dimensions, and any being who can perceive all 4 can therefore perceive everything that has, will and is happening from the point of view of a 3.5-dimensional being like ourselves - because time is an illusion and the whole of reality as we perceive it has already happened from the perspective of 4+ dimensional being. (Logically, this could be extended to state that the activities of any N dimensional being are predetermined from the point of view of any N+X dimensional being for values of X greater than or equal to 1). Again, this leaves the rather interesting state of affairs that nothing we do in any way, shape or form is free - or even will affect the outcome of anything.

Outside of the hard incompatibilist thinkers, you find the compatibilist mode of thought. This has appeared in writings from Hobbes, Hume and others and essentially states that one is free within constraints, but that while one's activities are predetermined - one appears to have free will at the time, and therefore free will is maintained. Ignoring the glaring problem with this (illusory freedom isn't particularly free!), one could build a philosophy based on the idea that one will act according to one's will - but the outcome is determined anyway. Catholics make this argument sometimes. Calvinism presents a somewhat bizarre attempt at compatibility, arguing that God has sovereignty over wisdom/power, but only offers his way as a life-raft to free-willed individuals. They state that his followers are pre-selected, and everyone else is free to do whatever they want on the way to hell. Charming. It also seems to raise an interesting question - if a loving God hand-picked the few to not have meaningful free will, why bother with the rest of creation if its entire purpose is to burn? Is heaven short of fuel?
A more interesting (and definitely more well thought-out than Calvinism) approach is taken by the Jewish faith, who openly admit that it is a paradox and they don't have an answer. At least they are honest.

On the other end of the spectrum, the libertarian camp argue that nothing is determined in advance and that therefore free will is exactly what it says. They reject the paradox by rejecting the deterministic aspect. This does not preclude religion; some modern Open Theists, and is found in some post-evangelical protestant groups. A very interesting proposition, technically only incompatible with hard incompatibilism because it rejects the issue entirely.

An extension of the modern Open Theists (and an attempt to once-again reconcile with determinism!) draws upon concepts of quantum uncertainty, and infinite parallel universes (the last explanation of this I read drew upon an 11-dimensional multiverse with some dimensions representing possible outcomes). Basically, you have the 4-dimension frozen universe model - but with an infinite number of frozen universes, one for each possible outcome of anything. The path we perceive selects branches as we progress - but other copies of us in (3.5D)(T)(number of choices+1) perceive the other choices. Theists can then extend that with the N+X dimensional model I mentioned above (in an 11-dimensional multiverse, God has 12+ dimensions) so that God then knows every possible past, present and future for everyone. Free will is maintained for the progression through time in that all choices are actually available - but all choices will be chosen, so on aggregate you have an infinite number of deterministic outcomes. That should give anyone a headache if you think about it long enough!
(As an aside... suppose heaven/hell, and an (effectively) infinite number of Herberts, and we make every possible decision through a chain of infinite dimensions. Do you end up with different fractions of infinite Herberts in heaven and hell?)

Obviously, I don't have a solution to this. I tend towards the libertarian or hard incompatibilist groups, and find the quantum concept fascinating. More thinking to do!

1 comment:

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