Is a Nuclear Armed Neighbourhood a Peaceful Neighbourhood?

Over a decade ago, Dr. Colin S. Gray proposed that a nuclear armed neighborhood may indeed be a more polite neighborhood. His argument was an extension of the classic pro-gun lobby in the US: if people have guns, assaulting them is more difficult and therefore less likely. (The weakness of that argument is that plenty of people in the USA have guns, and the gun-related crime rate heads unerringly upwards anyway. Heck, since Missouri passed it's concealed-carry law Columbia has started to see drive-by shootings!). Anyway, I've been mulling the concept a little this morning in light of the repeated news announcements about Iran's nuclear capability.

Dr. Gray (and related theorists) are also opponents of the concept of 'existential deterrence' - that is a nuclear deterrent that you keep simply for the purpose of deterring an enemy, with questionable resolve to actually use your deterrent if pressed. This is an interesting line of thought, since supposedly having a gun deters gun-violence - but having a nuclear arsenal does not deter military action. The differentiator is intent: if you have a gun, you have to be prepared to shoot someone (in self defense) if they cross a certain line. Likewise, a nuclear deterrent is meaningless if you aren't prepared to nuke someone for crossing another line. In deterrent theory it has even been stated that not knowing where the line is helps the deterrent: otherwise you may actually have to pull the trigger.

Israel has nuclear weapons. By all accounts, they have modern, accurate, deliverable systems. Despite this, while they have possessed the capability they have been shelled from the Golan Heights, lost a war in Lebanon, and suffered under Iranian/Syrian-led Hezbollah. Israel has exercised great restraint and hasn't launched nuclear weapons at anyone; for that, they should be commended. However, Israel certainly doesn't seem to have deterred anyone.

The USA also has nuclear weapons (and a current doctrine that permits first-use in some circumstances), and despite a prima facea attack on US soil by a group housed and sponsored by the government of Afghanistan - we didn't nuke them. Again, laudable restraint - but we really didn't deter Al Quaeda or Afghanistan.

Russia has nuclear weapons, and a clearly stated doctrine permitting first-use. Despite this, there has been very little indication that Russia might actually nuke any of the parties involved in disputes around their borders and satellite nations. Again, laudable: but how deterred were the Chechen's, Georgians or Moldovans?

One often-cited example in Dr. Gray's defense is that of India and Pakistan. Since both parties became nuclear, there have been fewer incidents close to all-out war along the Kashmiri border. However, India also had a significantly more pro-Muslim government for much of that time period. The real test will come when two radically opposed governments are once again in power in the two countries. It seems likely that neither side wants a nuclear war - but doesn't that just mean that convention struggles can continue (as they do!) without regard for the 'ultimate deterrent'?

Dr. Gray could reasonably argue that since all of the countries listed above lack a willingness to pull the nuclear trigger, their deterrent is hollow - and therefore not a deterrent at all. However, for as long as that argument remains solid then it must follow that a nuclear-armed-neighbourhood is not significantly different from a conventionally armed neighbourhood. Once nuclear first-use has happened in a conflict, that may change - we simply don't know. While praying to avoid that situation has worked thus far, sooner or later there will be a nuclear strike somewhere in the world. It's entirely possible that the strike will demonstrate that while nuclear weapons make a mess, they aren't significantly more useful than conventional rounds in modern warfare - at which point, whither deterrent?